Populist Leaders and Democratic Backsliding: A Comparison of the U.S. and Korea
The U.S. case
Democratic backsliding has been a globally observed phenomenon for decades.1 Although no universally agreed-upon definition exists, it is generally characterized by populist politicians in power who undermine democratic institutions and exhibit authoritarian tendencies. Bauer and his colleagues, who have extensively studied democratic backsliding, identify key strategies used by such politicians to accelerate this process: centralization of structure and resources, politicization of personnel and norms, and the reduction of accountability.2
Moynihan (2021) highlighted the prevalence of democratic backsliding in the U.S., particularly following Donald Trump's presidency in 2017, which had detrimental effects on public organizations.3 He evaluated the Trump administration’s actions in relation to the key strategies of democratic backsliding mentioned earlier. First, in an effort to centralize power within the White House, Trump appointed individuals from his personal network—such as family members and close associates—to key government positions. A notable example was the appointment of his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, as Senior Advisor to the President.4 Additionally, Trump allowed members of Mar-a-Lago, his private club, to act as unofficial advisors to the Department of Veterans Affairs, thereby granting them undue influence over crucial departmental decisions.5
Second, the politicization of personnel became evident through the Trump administration's prioritization of political loyalty and personal connections in selecting individuals for key government positions. According to Moynihan (2021), while appointing political allies is a common practice in U.S. politics, Trump took it to unprecedented extremes. Traditionally, presidents choose individuals who align with their political interests but still possess relevant expertise. However, many experienced professionals were unwilling to serve in the Trump administration, resulting in a limited talent pool. Consequently, Trump appointed individuals with little interest in public service, including lobbyists eager to exploit their positions for personal gain.6
Third, the Trump administration contributed to the politicization and distortion of public norms, particularly through the spread of conspiracy theories about the federal government. A notable example of this is the 'deep state' conspiracy theory, which alleges the existence of a hidden network of government officials, bureaucrats, and intelligence agents who secretly control policymaking, thereby hindering the president’s agenda.7 Trump frequently used Twitter (now X) to spread conspiracy-driven misinformation, including the false claim that federal employees affected by a government shutdown were predominantly Democrats.8
Finally, Trump consistently demonstrated a disregard for government accountability throughout his presidency. He fired FBI Director James Comey, who was leading an investigation into potential links between Trump’s campaign and Russia.9 Additionally, he repeatedly obstructed congressional oversight by refusing to comply with document requests related to allegations of corruption and abuse of power.10
The Korea case
The actions of President Trump that contributed to democratic backsliding find a striking parallel in the actions of South Korean President Yoon, who assumed office in 2022. In fact, Yoon went even further, engaging in extreme actions that could potentially dismantle democratic institutions, including his declaration of emergency martial law on December 3, 2024. Such a drastic measure is rarely seen in developed countries facing democratic backsliding, yet President Yoon went ahead with it. After the opposition party secured a majority in the 2024 congressional election, Yoon's initiatives faced significant obstacles. Unable to push his policies through the legislature, he declared emergency martial law, justifying his decision by claiming that 'the country was in grave danger due to the disruptive actions of the majority party in Congress.'
While discussions about Yoon’s undemocratic behavior have largely focused on the martial law declaration due to its prominence and gravity, his broader pattern of actions contributing to democratic backsliding since the beginning of his term also warrants attention.
To centralize power within his office, Yoon appointed former colleagues from the prosecution—where he had previously served—to key government positions, often without regard for the required expertise. This was widely criticized as an attempt to bring the government under the control of the prosecution.11 More notably, he appointed his high school alumni, Yonghyun Kim and Sangmin Lee, as the heads of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, which became key enablers for his push to implement emergency martial law.12
In addition to centralizing power, Yoon’s approach to personnel appointments also reflected a deep level of personalization. His appointments of individuals with little expertise in critical areas such as environmental, agricultural, fisheries, and transportation policy were driven more by political loyalty and personal connections than by qualifications.13 This pattern of appointing individuals for political gain was further evident when he chose far-right YouTubers known for promoting extreme theories to key positions, such as the director of the National Civil Service Human Resources Development Institute and the head of the Ministry of Unification. Yoon’s enthusiastic subscription to far-right YouTube channels added to the controversy, demonstrating that his personnel decisions were often made to consolidate power rather than promote effective governance.
The political distortion of public norms has been noticeable since the beginning of Yoon's term. Among many instances, the most prominent was his promotion of a conspiracy theory that denied the legitimacy of election institutions, using it as leverage to rally support for his political agenda.14 He publicly and repeatedly claimed that illegal activities had occurred during the 2024 Congressional election, leading to the victory of opposition parties. This conspiracy theory ultimately justified his attempt to deploy military officials to the National Election Commission during the emergency martial law in December 2024, with the aim of arresting the commission's director and employees.15 This narrative not only reinforced his support base among conservative citizens but also sowed doubt among the broader public, making many question whether election fraud had actually taken place. The most concerning aspect of this conspiracy is its long-term impact—eroding public trust in the legitimacy of the electoral system, which could lead to severe confusion and controversy in future elections.
Habits of avoiding accountability have been consistently observed. The First Lady faced accusations of manipulating the stock price of Deutsch Motors Inc. While other individuals involved in the manipulation were prosecuted, she was not properly investigated, possibly due to the President's connection to the prosecution. To address this, Congress passed legislative bills to investigate the First Lady several times, but the president vetoed them, preventing any investigation into her.16
Additionally, President Yoon is refusing to take responsibility for the events following the declaration of emergency martial law in December 2024. During this period, he took unconstitutional actions, including attempts to incapacitate Congress and arrest key figures such as the Chairman of the National Assembly, the opposition leader, a liberal journalist, and the president of the National Election Commission by mobilizing the military. After the impeachment bill was passed, his actions led to an investigation on charges of rebellion, prompting multiple summons from investigative bodies, all of which he ignored. The court issued an arrest warrant, but he resisted enforcement by blocking the entrance to his official residence and allowing the Presidential Security Service to use physical force against enforcement personnel if necessary. After his detention, he publicly condemned the judiciary, claiming it was unjust and under the influence of liberal parties.17 Since January 2025, he has appeared at the Constitutional Court's impeachment trials, where he has refused to take responsibility for his actions during the emergency martial law period.
Concluding Remarks
The illegal, irresponsible, and unjust actions of elite politicians have long-term detrimental effects on the civil service, undermining both the function and the image of government. The public may not view such behaviors as isolated incidents involving individual politicians, but rather as a foundation for broader distrust, believing that a government led by such figures cannot be trusted. In particular, the actions of Presidents Trump and Yoon have exacerbated political polarization in their respective countries. As a result, with each new administration bringing a distinct political ideology, opposition to and distrust of the president and their government may become the norm, further destabilizing governance.
In Korea, a concerning implication of the democratic backsliding observed in President Yoon’s administration is that it may not be limited to his term. In the U.S., despite severe criticism of his undemocratic governing style and inappropriate behavior—and even impeachment during his first term—President Trump was re-elected in 2024. A similar scenario could unfold in Korea. There have always been, and will continue to be, supporters of extreme right-wing ideologies. Although they do not constitute a majority, they tend to unify well and be vocal. As a result, their voices may be disproportionately amplified, creating the illusion that they represent the majority. Such perceptions could be manipulated by populist figures to consolidate their power, further destabilizing the democratic system.
Endnotes
1 Source: (1) Bermeo, N. 2016. On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy 27(1): 5-19., (2) Nord, M., Lundstedt, M., Altman, D., Angiolillo, F., Borella, C., Fernandes, T., Gastaldi, L., God, A. G., Natsika, N., & Lindberg, S. I. (2024). Democracy report 2024: Democracy wining and losing at the ballot. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute.
2 Bauer and Backer (2021) suggested five strategies of populist in government: (1) centralization of structure, (2) centralization of of resources, (3) politicization of personnel, (4) politicization of norms, (5) reduction of accountability. Source: Bauer, M. W., & Becker, S. (2020). Democratic Backsliding, Populism, and Public Administration, Perspectives on Public Management and Governance 3(1): 19–31,
3 The second to fifth paragraphs of this essay summarize Moynihan (2022). Source: Moynihan, D. P. (May 21, 2020). Populism and the Deep State: The Attack on Public Service Under Trump. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607309.
4 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/us/jared-kushner-senior-adviser-white-house-trump.html
5 https://www.propublica.org/article/ike-perlmutter-bruce-moskowitz-marc-sherman-shadow-rulers-of-the-va
6 https://www.propublica.org/article/we-found-a-staggering-281-lobbyists-whove-worked-in-the-trump-administration
9 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39866170
12 https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1007912737&plink=ORI&cooper=NAVER
13 https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0003066731
14 https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1177165.html
15 http://www.m-i.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1192179
16 https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2025/01/113_387062.html